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CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRUSTS AND ESTATES. By Richard R. Powell. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co. 1932. Vol. 1, pp. xliii, 1027. 1933. Vol. II, pp. xxxvii, 1040. 
THIS important and novel casebook by an experienced authority has already received, 
both before and after final publication, the widespread attention which it clearly 
deserves. It is obviously the product of intelligent original hypotheses, tested by 
classroom experience, and of much careful and constructive thought and industry. 
The difficulties usually inherent in casebook construction have been greatly increased 
by the ambitious magnitude of the task. One may imagine the expenditure of time 
and effort required by the formulation of the plan, the writing of text material, 
the construction of the unusually extensive and detailed notes, and the briefing of 
many of the cases used. At least those who have written casebooks themselves 
will appreciate the significance in this respect of Mr. Powell's statement that "fully 
three-quarters of the thirty-five hundred cases referred to in these two volumes 
have sufficient given of their facts and results to enable the student to appraise their 
contributions."l The book obviously deserves respect. Beyond that, it is alive 
and significant in its novelty. It is too early to predict its influence upon instruction 
in the field. The value and utility of any casebook of course depends in large 
measure upon the instructor using it, and upon the objectives and curricular arrange- 
ments of his school. It will be interesting to see how many will wish to follow 
in the classroom the trail that Mr. Powell has blazed; I am not at present 
convinced that I would want to do so. But this book, even if it is not actually 
adopted by a teacher, should at least interest or disturb him and provoke reexamina- 
tion of his own existing postulates. And the teaching profession should welcome 
such a constructive attempt to demonstrate that there may be a route through 
this particular area of the law that is more lifelike and stimulating than the care- 
fully cultivated paths of the traditional scheme. For the present, however, a 
reviewer can only state his personal reactions. 
I am heartily in accord with Mr. Powell's discontent with the usual curricular 
arrangements in this field in so far as it is caused by the courses in Wills and 
Trusts. I found2 the traditional course in Wills and Administration unsatisfactory 
for at least two reasons: First, much of the material in it seemed to me too 
simple to provide proper intellectual fare for mature students. Such matters as 
the details of the execution, revocation and revalidation of wills, granting their 
obvious practical importance, can be greatly condensed without serious loss. Such 
condensation is more likely to occur if the material is merged and therefore con- 
trasted with other matter of higher intellectual content. I personally deal with 
it largely in textual form. Conceding the general value of the case method, do 
we not approach a reductio ad absurdum when the investment of time which it 
requires yields such a slight return as it does when used for simple informational 
matters? Secondly, this course seemed to me to set up artificial barriers that 
cramped understanding, because it excluded related questions of the substantive 
1. Preface, Vol. I, p. viii. 
2. The past tense is used because these courses disappeared from the Yale curriculum. 
two years ago. 
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law of gifts and trusts and, in so far as administration of decedent estates really 
received attention,3 of the management of estates by trustees. 
The pros and cons of the controversy over the desirability of the use of the 
trust4 as a basis of classification for curricular and other5 purposes have probably 
by now been sufficiently aired. I will merely say briefly that the traditional 
Trusts course left2 me, even more than the Wills course did, with a sense of 
incompleteness of understanding and perspective, due again to barriers set up by 
a synthesis based on a legal concept, however fully the course might outline the 
doctrinal structure of its subject matter. This course is presumably based on 
the assumption that it is desirable to group together for teaching purposes cases 
of which the common factor is the use of the trust by the parties, by the court, 
or by both. To accompany the trust on its peregrinations through varied and 
not necessarily related types of human activity may be interesting and important 
for some purposes, but does not seem to me to be 'the most efficient teaching 
arrangement. I believe that it renders incomplete the consideration of particular 
issues both in the Trusts course and elsewhere. I think that students will be 
better able to handle and to understand the trust, either as a consciously adopted 
form of transfer or as an argumentative device, if it is treated in combination 
with other materials in connection with the situations to which it and they are 
relevant. I suspect that students will be sufficiently impressed with its ubiquitous 
utility if they meet it constantly in the curriculum. I am willing to take a chance 
on sacrificing the ideal of an integrated comprehensive view of the varied uses of 
the trust, particularly since this ideal has become somewhat theoretical. The 
commercial uses of the trust have, in at least some curricula, been largely assimilated 
by other courses. Much of what remains concerns the gratuitous disposition of 
wealth, and may profitably be merged with wills and other materials affecting that 
general field. I believe that, after such a merger, the materials should be redis- 
tributed into two courses, one on the substantive law and the other on management 
of estates. 
I am not convinced of the desirability of Mr. Powell's proposal that materials on 
future interests be included in this merger. I make this statement with some 
diffidence, because dissatisfaction with the Future Interests course seems to have 
been Mr. Powell's original stimulus,6 and very likely he and his students see 
relationships that are not apparent to a reviewer with only the casebook before 
him. That trusts, wills, and future interests are factually related subjects is 
clear enough. It may be advisable to require students of future interests to have 
some previous acquaintance with the law of wills and trusts, which can be 
accomplished by a prerequisite requirement under an arrangement of separate 
courses. But I believe that contemporaneous treatment is unnecessary, and that 
the materials involving trusts and wills can be properly understood without a 
knowledge of future interests. I think that a course focused on the drafting, validity 
and effect of dispositive provisions in instruments of transfer is a satisfactory teach- 
3. Such attention should surely be encouraged by the intelligent emphasis on and 
treatment of administration in MECHEM AND ATKINSON, CASES ON WILLS AND ADMINIS- 
TRATION (1928). 
4. To simplify the form of statement, the term "trust" is used in the singular without 
attempting to enumerate the different ideas connoted by its varying content. 
5. See Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 800; 
Scott, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 1266. 
6. Preface, Vol. I, p. v. 
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ing vehicle by itself. Perhaps "Future Interests" is too restrictive a title, since the 
problems of restraints on alienation and of accumulations, included by Mr. Powell 
in his casebook, also belong there. The most important consideration is that such 
a course seems to have intellectual unity. But, in addition, it probably suits the 
emotional attitude of instructor and student toward that rara avis, future interests. 
I suspect that at least a slight addiction to the mania referred to by Mr. Mechem7 
is essential to successful teaching of this subject. A teacher so affected may 
well prefer to direct his drive and enthusiasm toward overcoming the obstacles of 
a single though complicated job, rather than to dissipate his energies over a 
broader field. If giving the course recommended by Mr. Powell, will he not tend 
to overemphasize future interests at the expense of the other materials?8 And 
I am not sure that the teacher who likes future interests will like trusts or wills, 
or vice versa; or that this course would not raise difficulties of instructional 
assignments in some faculties. 
The length of Mr. Powell's course will be considered by some a serious objection 
to it. According to Mr. Powell's statement9 he and Mr. Cheatham covered these 
materials in 112 class hours, with the assistance of what is probably a good deal 
more than the average amount of outside work by the students. I doubt very 
much if other instructors could proceed as rapidly through over two thousand 
pages of very closely packed material. Assuming that they could, the curricular 
arrangements of most schools indicate a general opinion, in which I concur, that 
shorter courses than this are preferable for both student and instructor. No 
doubt in anticipation of this objection, Mr. Powell has outlined arrangements for 
shorter courses, saying that "such curtailment is not recommended but is possible."10 
With the constant growth in the possible subject matter of law school instruction, 
a school may wish to employ such a compression of existing subjects into a single 
course. On this basis, presumably the plan would appeal to schools which, unlike 
Columbia, have a limited teaching force, and wish to decrease or avoid an increase 
in teaching hours. I personally prefer a sequence of several courses, permitting 
specialization and flexibility of schedule, to a long single course which will compel 
the individual student to take everything or nothing. Under the present arrange- 
ment at Yale, there are three courses in this field. The first deals with the 
general substantive law of intestate succession, wills, gifts inter vivos and causa 
mortis, and non-commercial trusts; the second with management of estates by 
executors, administrators and trustees; and the third with future interests. In 
addition, there is honors work available. This makes it possible for a student to 
take anything from a minimum of three semester hours, sufficient to acquaint him 
with the more common terms and concepts, to an indefinite maximum. 
7. "It is a matter of common knowledge that Future Interests is not properly a 
course but an obsession, and that teachers of it in time develop a complex, akin 
perhaps to the Jehovah-complex, which leads them to think that the law school exists 
for the sole purpose of teaching Future Interests." Book Review (1933) 19 IOWA L. REV. 
146, 149. 
8. According to my calculations from Mr. Powell's schedule, printed in the Appendix 
(Vol. II, p. 1013) he devotes about one-half of the classroom time allotted to this 
course to future interests, and slightly more than one-half of the outside reading 
required of students concerns that subject. Perhaps this proportion might be reduced 
if Mr. Powell were not teaching so many prospective New York practitioners. 
9. Vol. II, p. 1013. 
10. Ibid. 
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Mr. Powell's course, again assuming that other instructors will not need more 
time than he allots to it, effects a substantial reduction in the classroom hours 
usually consumed by the merged courses. If it did not do so, it would be quite 
unmanageable in length. This is of course commendable in so far as it results 
from elimination of duplication. But the share of this important field in the 
curriculum should not be reduced to the point of requiring the omission of 
significant matters. I feel that, in selecting his materials, Mr. Powell has somewhat 
over-emphasized the approach, important though it is, to the problem of drafting 
instruments so as to care for comparatively large estates. Clients are unfor- 
tunately not always wealthy. And lawyers are not always able to guide in advance 
the actions of their clients or of opponents of their clients. Some of the matters 
entirely or virtually omitted in this casebook seem to me not merely independently 
important but also valuable in their contribution to understanding and perspective 
because of their close relationship to the subject matter of the course. I believe 
the subject of intestate succession to be quite basic in this field, particularly when 
joined with the restrictions imposed on alienation by the rights of the surviving 
spouse. It is involved, not only in actual distribution of estates that are wholly 
or partially intestate, but also in other issues, such as the construction of some 
testamentary gifts and the determination of the right to contest. And a transferor 
should know the extent to which the rights of his family furnish an alternative to, 
or a restraint upon, his disposition. In view of Mr. Powell's emphasis on "the 
constant core of the familial function,"11 one would expect to find more attention 
given to this matter. But, although the historical antecedents,'2 relative fre- 
quency,13 philosophy,14 and comparative law15 of intestate succession are included. 
the details of the modern American law on the subject are only incidentally referred 
to.16 Mr. Powell states:17 "Little as to the handling of intestate estates has 
been included herein. Such estates are typically small;18 the law applicable is 
simple;19 there are reasonably adequate text discussions of the field; and the editor 
has observed that in law schools announcing a course on 'Wills and Administration' 
few days of the term remain when the class begins the topic of 'Administration'."20 
Again, consideration of the law of gifts inter vivos and causa mortis seems to me 
to shed considerable light on the law of wills and trusts, as well as to involve 
interesting and difficult problems in the application of the doctrine of delivery to 
11. Vol. I, p. 53. 
12. Vol. I, p. 3. 
13. Vol. I, p. 39. 
14. Vol. I, p. 234. 
15. Vol. I, p. 248. 
16. See, in addition to the above, Vol. I, p. 257, note 24; p. 314, note 74; p. 867 et seq. 
17. Vol. I, p. vi. 
18. But they are numerous. See Vol. I, p. 39. And, even in testate estates, there 
is often the possibility of a claim by the surviving spouse. 
19. This is probably true of the ordinary questions involved in determining intestate 
successors (e.g. computation of degrees, representation, effect of adoption, etc.) but not 
of the rights of the spouse, which Mr. Powell no doubt does not intend to include in his 
statement. And, if the law is simple, it can be worked into the course without much 
expenditure of time. 
20. I wonder if this is generally true. It was not so in the course that I gave, using 
the casebook by Mechem and Atkinson. If it is true, it does not appeal to me as a 
particularly important reason. 
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the transfer of choses in action. Mr. Powell has only one case on gifts causa 
mortis21 and a few indirect references.22 He says:23 "Logically, inter vivos gifts 
unaccompanied by a trust constitute a part of this same picture. Practically 
they play a small role." I do not understand the latter statement. Possibly it 
is due to his emphasis on drafting, since many gifts are made or attempted without 
benefit of legal advice. But the reports are full of cases of such inter vivos and 
causa mortis gifts; they often base claims against decedent estates; and they may 
and sometimes do involve large amounts.24 Further, the virtual omission of materials 
on administration of decedent estates by executors and administrators25 seems surpris- 
ing, in view of its practical importance and close relationship to the management of 
estates by trustees. For these and other26 reasons I believe that Mr. Powell's concep- 
tion of the objectives of merger in this field is, in many respects, different from my 
own. 
In conclusion, to offset the perhaps disproportionate amount of space devoted 
to disagreement in this review, I wish to incorporate here by reference my first 
paragraph. Replete with important information intelligently treated, Mr. Powell's 
casebook is an extremely valuable contribution to the legal literature of this 
field. 
Yale School of Law. ASHBEL GREEN GULLIVER. 
THE PORTUGUESE BANK NOTE CASE. By Sir Cecil Hermann Kisch. London: Mac- 
millan and Co. 1932. pp. ix, 284. 
THE Portuguese Bank Note Case1 arose out of a gigantic financial swindle, notable 
alike for its ingenuity, daring, and success. During 1925 Messrs. Waterlow & Sons, 
Ltd., a well known London firm, which held a contract for the printing of notes for 
the Bank of Portugal, was tricked into supplying a group of crooks, among whom 
figured the Portuguese Minister to the Hague, with a considerable mass of so-called 
Vasco de Gama notes of 500 escudos each. The firm acted under the belief that 
the notes were intended to be put into circulation in the Portuguese Colony of Angola 
as a part of scheme for instilling health into its finances, then in a very sorry condi- 
tion. From time to time the conspirators produced forged documents purporting to 
convey the authority of the Bank for the printing of the notes and for their delivery 
to an agent of the gang. Poor Angola was never given the chance of testing the 
magic restorative power of a heavy administration of fresh paper money, for the 
swindlers, having through an extraordinary combination of circumstances succeeded 
21. Vol. I, p. 108. 
22. Vol. I, p. 116; Vol. II, p. 27. 
23. Vol. I, p. 1. 
24. Cf. Chase Nat. Bank of New York v. Sayles, 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926) 
($1,500,000). 
25. Perhaps on the assumption that the student can assimilate the procedure after 
leaving law school. The ease of assimilation will depend on his location. 
26. For example, I would prefer dealing with the interrelationship of the forms of 
transfer after, rather than before (Vol. I, p. 108), considering them separately. There 
are many other details of form and arrangement that I am interested in but refrain from 
discussing in order to keep this review within bounds. 
1. Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow and Sons, Ltd. [1932] A. C. 452. 
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